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The Impact of the Great Recession on Economic Well-being:
How Different are OECD Nations and Why?

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The Impact of the Great Recession on Economic Well-being: How Different are OECD Nations and Why?

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Since 1998, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards has published the Index of Economic Well-Being (IEWB), which attempts to estimate the level and trend of aggregate economic well-being in Canada and other OECD nations. However, in September 2008 the global economy sank into recession and the long run trend in some (but not all) countries became dominated by short run shocks. The sudden onset of the global recession, and the particular combination of financial crisis and real economy decline that has characterized this recession, raise many questions for the measurement of aggregate economic well-being.

This paper presents estimates of the Index of Economic Well-being for Australia*, Belgium, Canada*, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany*, Italy, Netherlands, Norway*, Spain, Sweden*, the UK* and the USA* from 1995 to 2010. However, because discussion of fourteen different countries rapidly becomes very unwieldy, we focus initially on four nations – the United States, Canada, Germany and Spain. These particular countries are chosen because within both the ‘Anglo’ and ‘Continental European’ welfare state regimes one can observe great variation in the impacts of the Great Recession, and it is interesting to compare countries where the recession has had a large and continuing impact (Spain and United States) with countries which had largely recovered by 2010 (Germany and Canada). We then compare all 14 countries’ experiences.

We ask: (1) How has the recession changed the level of well-being in different countries, as indicated by the IEWB? (2) Did countries have similar or different shocks to the different components of their economic well-being in the 2007 to 2010 period? and (3) How different is the within-country cyclical relationship between changes in dimensions of economic well-being and GDP growth or unemployment?

Because we can be sure that some readers of this paper will not have read our earlier papers, we start Section 1 with a brief outline of the methodology of the Index of Economic Well-Being, (which readers of our earlier work may wish to skip over) and a summary of how the Great Recession differed across countries in its impact on GDP and employment. To set the context for our discussion of cyclical impacts on the IEWB, Section 2 discusses trends of the IEWB in Canada, the United States, Germany and Spain from 1995 to 2010. Section 3 then compares the differing impacts of the Great Recession on the components of economic well-

1 See Osberg and Sharpe (1998, 2000 and 2002). In previous papers, we relied on the Luxembourg Income Study for the data underlying our poverty rate and gap calculations and estimated intervening years (i.e. those not available in LIS) by interpolation. Where possible, the current paper substitutes Eurostat estimates, which are available beginning in 1995 for each year for most European nations – see Appendix A for discussion.
2 Osberg and Sharpe (2005) discussed, for the seven countries marked here with an asterik, the differences between using GDP per capita or the IEWB as a component of the Human Development Index, over the period 1980 to 2001.
being during the 2007-2010 period across all 14 countries. Section 4 discusses the sensitivity of different dimensions of well-being to year to year changes in output and unemployment while Section 5 summarizes possible implications.

1. (a) **The Index of Economic Well-being: Motivation and Framework**

The IEWB is an intermediate type of index. While broader in conception than GDP per capita, it still aims only at the ‘economic’ dimension of life. The philosophy of the IEWB is that there is more to “well-being” than economic well-being, but there is more to economic well-being than GDP per capita, and it is useful to have better measures of the economic well-being of society because better measurement may help guide better decisions. The IEWB avoids consideration of broader ‘quality of life’ issues (such as crime rates) on the grounds that too much aggregation of the dissimilar dimensions of social and political well-being can obscure understanding. Rather, the IEWB takes a broad view of “economic well-being” as “access to the resources needed for material consumption” because the narrow focus of GDP accounting omits consideration of many issues (for example, leisure time, longevity of life, asset stock levels) which are important to the command over resources of individuals. The Index of Economic Well-Being is based on four dimensions of economic well-being – average current consumption flows, aggregate accumulation for future consumption (i.e. per capita wealth – broadly conceived), income distribution, and economic security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Typical Citizen” or “Representative Agent”</td>
<td>[A] <em>Average Flow of Current Income</em></td>
<td>[B] <em>Aggregate Accumulation of Productive Stocks</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity of Individual Citizens</td>
<td>[C] <em>Distribution of Potential Consumption – Income Inequality and Poverty</em></td>
<td>[D] <em>Insecurity of Future Incomes</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 1 illustrates our identification of four components of well-being, which recognize trends in both average outcomes and in the diversity of outcomes, both now and in the future. When an average income flow concept, like GDP per capita, is used as a summative index of

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3 This section is largely based on Osberg and Sharpe (2005).
society’s well-being, the analyst implicitly is stopping in quadrant [A]. This assumes (a) that the experience of a representative agent can summarize the well-being of society and (b) that the measured income flow optimally weights consumption and savings, so that one need not explicitly distinguish between present consumption flows and the accumulation of asset stocks which will enable future consumption flows. However, if society is composed of diverse individuals living in an uncertain world who typically “live in the present, anticipating the future,” each individual’s estimate of societal economic well-being will depend on the proportion of national income saved for the future – i.e. both quadrants [A] and [B] matter.

As well, real societies are not equal. There is a long tradition in economics that “social welfare” depends on both average incomes and the degree of inequality and poverty in the distribution of incomes – quadrant [C]. Putting individual heterogeneity and multiple time periods together, we have quadrant [D]. Ex ante, individuals do not know who will be hit by the hazards of economic life. When the future is uncertain, and complete insurance is unobtainable (either privately or through the welfare state), risk-averse individuals will care about the degree to which the economic future is secure.

The four components of the IEWB used in this paper are made up of a number of variables, as shown in the weighting tree below.4 The consumption component, measured in prices on a per capita basis, includes private consumption, with adjustments for family size and life expectancy, public consumption, and changes in the value of leisure as proxied by changes in working time. The wealth component, measured in prices on a per capita basis, includes estimates of residential and non-residential physical capital, R&D capital, human capital, the net international investment position, and environmental degradation, as proxied by the social costs of greenhouse gases. The equality component, measured as an index, includes a measure of income distribution, the Gini coefficient and poverty intensity (the product of the poverty rate and gap) for all persons. The Gini is given a weight of 0.25 and poverty intensity is weighted 0.75. The economic security component, also measured as an index, consists of four sub-components: the risk from unemployment; the financial risk from illness; the risk from single parent poverty; and the risk from poverty in old age. Each sub-component is weighted by the relative importance of the population affected by the risk.

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4 It is important to note that the estimates of the IEWB for OECD countries contain fewer variables than IEWB estimates for Canada and the provinces because of greater data available for Canada than for OECD countries. For example, the latter estimates include data on certain regrettable expenditures, household production, and natural resources.
These four components therefore have a logical rationale and a manageable dimensionality – the IEWB is calculated as the weighted sum of \([A] + [B] + [C] + [D]\). However, although we may all agree that these four dimensions of well-being are all valuable to some degree, individuals differ in their relative preferences for each component. Some people, for example, consider equality to be more important than environmental preservation or per capita wealth, while others think the opposite. Different individuals often assign differing degrees of relative importance to each dimension of well-being – indeed, each citizen in a democratic society has the right to come to a personal conclusion about the relative weight of each dimension. But because all citizens are occasionally called upon, in a democracy, to exercise choices (e.g. in voting) on issues that affect the collectivity (and some individuals, such as civil servants, make such decisions on a daily basis), they all also have reason sometimes to ask questions of the form: “Would public policy X make ‘society’ better off?”

A measure of social well-being can be useful if some people, at least some of the time, want to answer such questions in an evidence-based way. We can assume that individuals know more about their own preferences and their own life situation than anyone else is likely to know,
so individuals probably do not need help in calculating the implications for their own personal utility of public policy on any given issue. However, individuals who care about some combination of their own well-being and society’s well-being can be seen as maximizing: \( U_i = \forall_1 \text{(own utility)} + \forall_2 \text{(Social Index expressing own estimate of society’s well-being)} \). If \( \forall_2 = 0 \) for all persons, at all times, then there is no point in constructing the IEWB – or any other social index. We are presuming that for some people, at least some of the time, \( \forall_2 \neq 0 \).

In the real world, citizens are frequently called upon to choose between policies which affect dimensions of life (e.g. education, or health or the environment) that cannot be measured in directly comparable units. Hence, individuals often have to come to a summative decision – i.e. have a way of “adding it all up” – across domains that are conceptually dissimilar. We argue that the role of people who construct social indices should be one of helping citizens – e.g. as voters in elections and as bureaucrats in policy making – to come to reasonable summative decisions about the level of society’s well-being. From this perspective, the purpose of index construction should be to help individuals think systematically about public policy, without necessarily presuming that all individuals have the same values. Although it may not be possible to define an objective index of societal well-being, individuals still have the problem (indeed, the moral responsibility) of coming to a subjective evaluation of social states, and they need organized, objective data if they are to do it in a reasonable way.

1 (b) The Differing Impacts of the Great Recession

Conventional summary statistics on the impacts of the Great Recession do not, to put it mildly, tell a consistent story across countries. In Table 1, columns 1 and 2 report the total percentage change in employment and in GDP per capita between 2007 and 2010 in the 14 countries examined. Comparing 2007 and 2010, total employment was up by 5.7% in Australia and down by 9.4% in Spain. Column 1 shows that there is a nearly even split between the 8 countries with a net increase in employment over the period among the population aged 15 to 64 and the 6 countries which have experienced a net decline in employment. Differentials in growth of GDP per capita are not quite as dramatic – as Column 2 shows, only in Belgium and Germany was the recovery in employment large enough to produce a net improvement in GDP per capita. But although one would normally expect the direction of change in employment and growth in GDP per capita to be the same, this is only true in half the countries.

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5 The onset of the recession in late 2008 implies that 2007 is the last full year’s pre-recession data.
Table 1
The Varying Impacts of the Great Recession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Δ employment</th>
<th>% Δ GDP/capita</th>
<th>Δ Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>ΔIEWB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-9.4%</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-5.4%</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Belgium and Germany had more jobs and higher GDP per capita in 2010 than in 2007. There were 5 other countries with net employment creation (Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Norway and the UK) but with negative GDP per capita growth. By contrast, the period was unambiguously bad news in Finland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the USA where both employment and GDP per capita were lower in 2010 than in 2007. Indeed, US employment in 2010 was still 5.4% below its 2007 level and employment in Spain was still down by 9.4%.6

Conventional statistics thus reveal large differences, across countries, in the depth and duration of the impacts of the recession which followed the Financial Crisis of 2008. What do indices of well-being indicate?

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6 Estimates for all 14 countries can be found in Table A11-1, in the appendix tables accompanying this paper.
2. **Trends in the IEWB in Canada, Germany, Spain and the USA 1995 to 2010.**

Charts 1 to 4 compare long run trends in the four components of economic well-being, and the IEWB as a whole, with trends in GDP for four illustrative countries (the United States, Canada, Germany and Spain). For each country, we compare trends in the "base" index with trends in GDP per capita. Charts 1 to 4 show the level in each year of the index of each component of economic well-being (i.e. consumption, accumulation, distribution and economic security) as well as the level of the aggregate Index of Economic Well-being when each component receives equal weight. To facilitate comparisons, we also apply the Linear Scaling methodology to GDP per capita. To keep all our comparisons on a common footing, we use the [Max-Min] range defined by data from the 14 countries for which we construct the Index of Economic Well-being.

Chart 1 looks at the United States, with dashed lines marking the level of aggregate

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8 Linear Scaling is used – i.e. each of the four components of economic well-being is assigned an indexed value equal to \( \frac{\text{Value} - \text{Min}}{\text{Max} - \text{Min}} \) which represents the relative position of that country, in that year, on the range from Maximum (feasible value) to Minimum (feasible value), where both maximum and minimum are set at the actual extremes of the values observed in all countries and all years of the present study, plus (or minus) 10 per cent of the actual observed range.
indices (GDP per capita and the IEWB) and solid lines representing the components of the IEWB (consumption, accumulation, equality and economic security). The U.S. Index of Economic Well-being illustrates how aggregate well-being can be driven by diverging trends in the components of well-being. If the four components are equally weighted, as in Chart 1, the IEWB shows a lower level and a flatter trend over the period than per capita consumption (which rose strongly) and aggregate wealth (a somewhat smaller increase than for consumption). Both market consumption and investment are important components of GDP, and the upward trend in GDP per capita exceeds that in the IEWB. However, compared to the other countries examined here, the United States sits low in the range of observed equality and security, with a downward trend over time. As a consequence, when all four components are weighted equally in the IEWB, the downward trend in equality and security offsets the high level and upward trend of average consumption and aggregate wealth – implying that the aggregate Index of Economic Well-Being is quite flat, especially compared to consumption trends.

**Chart 2**

*Trends in the IEWB, Components & Scaled GDP per Capita, Canada, 1995-2010*

A moderate upward trend for the IEWB was observed for Canada (Chart 2). One can see in the data both the stronger upward trend in GDP per capita and the deviation downward which marked the recession of 2007-2009. In Canada, the IEWB has been less volatile than GDP because the components of the IEWB are heavily influenced by factors which do not necessarily
vary with the business cycle or respond directly to economic growth. For example, security from the risks of uninsured health care costs has declined over time in Canada, but on a secular trend.\textsuperscript{9} Looking only at the period of time discussed in this paper (1995-2010), one will not be able to observe the impact on equality in Canada of the substantial cuts to social assistance and unemployment insurance made in 1995-96. Even so, a downward shift in equality in Canada, together with some decline in security,\textsuperscript{10} offset much of the strong long run growth in consumption and wealth.

The Great Recession may be a smallish bump in Canadian trends, but it is all too apparent in the Spanish data for 2008-2010. Indeed, in Spain between 2007 and 2010, a moderate increase (from 12.9\% to 14.4\%) in the poverty rate interacts multiplicatively with a large increase in the poverty gap (from 0.242 to 0.355) to cause a large increase in poverty intensity \([= (\text{poverty rate})*(\text{average poverty gap})]\). Because the IEWB index of equality trends is 0.25 weighted to the Gini index of equivalent income and 0.75 weighted to poverty intensity, the downward dive in the equality component of the IEWB after 2007 is especially notable. The

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\textsuperscript{9} For most people, prescription drug costs are not, for example, covered under public health insurance in Canada, and their costs have risen over time.

\textsuperscript{10} Note that the deficiencies of internationally comparable data prevent us from incorporating the decline in UI/EI coverage in Canada over this period. See Osberg (2009) for a fuller discussion.
unemployment rate increase (from 8.3% to 20.2%) in Spain also shows up clearly in the economic security component of the IEWB. The wealth and consumption components of the IEWB also declined in the recession, but not to the same degree. Since consumption is a large fraction of GDP, it is not surprising that trends in consumption and GDP are quite similar.

Together, the large declines in equality and economic security in Spain mean that the IEWB fell there by considerably more than the change in GDP per capita. Unlike the pattern observed in Canada (where the IEWB was less volatile), economic well-being in Spain changed more in this recession than did GDP per capita. In Section 4 of this paper we will see that within-country year to year changes in output and employment often do not significantly affect the IEWB index of equality – presumably because most such changes have historically been marginal impacts on the income distribution. However, the Spanish example of 2007-2010 may be a reminder that sometimes changes in output and employment are more than marginal, with large and multiplicative impacts on equality.

A significant feature of the German data is the strong upward movement of the poverty rate (from 6.7% to 9.5%) and the poverty gap (from 0.174 to 0.219) over the 2005 to 2007 period, i.e. before the Great Recession. This gives a strong downward push to our equality index, prior to the recession, which then improves slightly over the same period during which other
countries (e.g. Spain) experienced strong deterioration. Although the recession did produce a slight downward bump in GDP in 2009, it is hard to see in the German data (Chart 4) evidence of any impact at all on indicators of economic well-being. However, this is partly an issue of idiosyncratic context – the fact that the rate and depth of German poverty had increased so strongly before the recession. Obtaining a fuller understanding of German trends over the 2005 to 2007 period is an important objective of our future research.

3. Divergences and Commonalities in Economic Well-Being within countries: 2007-2010

Chart 5 compares the over-all movement in economic well-being between 2007 and 2010 in the 14 countries examined in this study, and Charts 6 to 9 compare movements in the four components of well-being – average consumption, per capita wealth, equality and economic security. Although Chart 5 indicates a wide divergence across nations in the direction and size of trends in aggregate economic well-being, those results on aggregate well-being depend crucially on the fact that Chart 5 weights each component of well-being equally. Denmark and Spain have done poorly on most dimensions of well-being and Norway, Germany and Finland have done well – but in between the rankings of countries differ widely. If all the components of economic well-being had followed similar trends over time, the relative weights placed on each component would not matter much – but that is not the case for most of the countries examined here. Hence, one way of reading the comparisons of Charts 6 to 9 is to say that they illustrate the importance of the relative weights assigned to each component of economic well-being.

As Chart 6 illustrates, most nations actually avoided a decrease in per-capita consumption
between 2007 and 2010 – Spain and the UK are outliers, with declines of 0.044 and 0.053 index points respectively (which is about the same as the difference in 2010 between Australia and Belgium in per capita consumption). Hence, an analyst who believed that the most important component in economic well-being is the level of per-capita consumption, and assigned a high relative weight to that component, would tend to conclude that economic well-being had increased over the 2007-2010 period – at least for 12 of the 14 countries.

Chart 7 tells an even more positive story for aggregate wealth. Spain did poorly on other dimensions, but the rise in its wealth index (by 0.037) was near the median of country performance. The only nation with a decline over the period 2007 to 2010 was Sweden (a change which was very small -0.009 index points). Hence, an analyst whose values emphasized the importance of aggregate sustainability, and who therefore assigned a large weight to the aggregate accumulation of productive resources, could easily come to the conclusion that 2007-2010 was a period of positive outcomes, for almost all countries.
Our measures of consumption per capita and aggregate accumulation extend national income accounting measures in several important ways (e.g. we make allowance for the impact on effective consumption of trends in household size and include environmental stocks and depreciated Research and Development spending as part of the accumulation of productive assets). Nevertheless, they are heavily influenced by trends in the underlying SNA measures of consumption and investment – and they share with GDP calculations the fact that they are aggregate measures, which entirely ignore distributional issues and uncertainty about the future.

In constructing the IEWB, we have argued repeatedly for a methodology that does not always and automatically assign a zero weight to distributional and insecurity issues. As Charts 8 and 9 indicate, when these issues are considered the 2007-2010 period generally looks much less positive than when they are ignored (as in Charts 6 and 7). Chart 8 shows how adverse movements in poverty and inequality were quite significant in several countries (as already discussed, worst in Spain, not just because the poverty rate increased but also because the average depth of poverty grew significantly). Marginal improvements in our Equality index in Norway and Germany contrast with declines in Canada, France, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden.

As Chart 9 shows, our Economic Security index declined in 13 of 14 countries.
Taken together, Charts 5 to 9 imply a potential for differing values to drive divergence in assessment of the implications of the Great Recession. Those who favour the view that measures of economic well-being should focus on aggregates or averages – such as per capita consumption or wealth – will be likely to assess the 2007 to 2010 period as predominantly positive, in almost all of the 14 nations we study. Those who emphasize the importance of equality in the distribution of current income and economic security about future income will be likely to come to the opposite conclusion – and especially so if concerns about greater economic insecurity are considered more relatively important. The weighting of the different dimensions of well-being thus matters significantly. Indeed, making more transparent this sensitivity of aggregate measures of well-being to the underlying components of well-being has always been one of our major objectives in constructing the IEWB.

4. **The relationship between Changes in the IEWB, its components and GDP per capita or Unemployment**
When a recession occurs its impact is often discussed with reference to changes in output or unemployment. This paper has been urging that the welfare implications of business cycle variations be assessed using the Index of Economic Well-Being, and it has argued that business cycle impacts on the components of well-being differ significantly. How can one assess the relationship between conventional measures of business cycle impacts and the IEWB? Can one argue that some countries do a better job than others in reducing the volatility of well-being – i.e. for a given size of shock to unemployment or output, do some countries do better than others in limiting the impact on indicators of well-being of business cycle variations in output and unemployment?

Arthur Okun’s estimation of the relationship between changes in GDP and changes in the unemployment rate has attained the status of being labelled “Okun’s Law”. To assess the relationship between output variability (or unemployment changes) and changes in economic well-being, we rely on a similar specification. Specifically, we start by estimating OLS equations of the form:

1. \[ \Delta \text{IEWB} = k_1 + c_1 \times (\Delta \text{unemployment}) \]
2. \[ \Delta \text{IEWB} = k_2 + c_2 \times (\% \Delta \text{Output}) \]

We estimate equations (1) and (2) by OLS separately for each country – since our data is limited to 15 annual observations for each country, the standard error of these estimates is necessarily large.\(^{11}\) We discuss first the results for changes in the aggregate IEWB (equally weighted), and then proceed to discuss the results of similar regression estimates of the relationship between changes in the components (wealth accumulation, consumption, equality and security) of the IEWB and changes in unemployment and output. Each chart presents, for each country and for the pooled sample, bar graph representations of our estimates of coefficients \(c_1\) and \(c_2\) respectively, with the plus or minus two standard error confidence interval marked (where this interval spans zero, the interpretation is that one cannot reject, at 95% confidence, the hypothesis that the value of the coefficient is really zero).

As Chart 10 indicates, changes in the unemployment rate do negatively affect the aggregate (equally weighted) IEWB in most countries but only in five countries is this statistically significantly different from zero. Output changes are positively correlated – but also often indistinguishable from zero at a 95% level of statistical confidence. Is this a reasonable pattern for a defensible index of economic well-being?

\(^{11}\) For illustrative purposes we also estimated (1) and (2) jointly for all 14 countries and present those results and the plus or minus two standard error confidence interval - which indicate that the hypothesis of equality of coefficients across countries should generally be rejected, and therefore that pooling of country data would be inappropriate.
To illustrate why aggregate indices of economic well-being might not be very sensitive to short-run variations in GDP per capita and unemployment, Chart 12 presents the $c_1$ estimates of the relationship between year to year changes in unemployment and the wealth index and Chart 13 presents the $c_2$ estimates of the relationship between year to year changes in GDP and the wealth index. Since wealth stocks are built up over many years, it is reasonable to think that they are not likely to be particularly sensitive to year to year variations in output or unemployment – as Charts 12 and 13 indicate.
Chart 14 presents the $c_1$ estimates of the relationship between year to year changes in unemployment and the equality index and Chart 15 presents estimates of the $c_2$ coefficient linking year to year changes in GDP and the equality index. One can sometimes forget that when the unemployment rate increases from 4% to 6%, one can equally well describe this as the unemployment rate increasing by half or as a decline from 96% to 94% in the percentage of the labour force employed (i.e. a change of $1/48^{th}$). In most years, year to year changes in output or employment are not large, and measures of inequality within countries are dominated by the continuing inequalities among the vast majority. Charts 14 and 15 show that year to year changes in GDP and unemployment are, for the 1995 to 2010 period as a whole, not strongly related to year to year changes in the equality index. However, the 2007-2010 shock to GDP in
Spain was strong enough to show up as a statistically significant positive correlation between GDP changes and equality index changes, and our results in Section 2 may indicate that non-marginal shocks can interact multiplicatively to produce significantly sized impacts.
Since per capita consumption is an annual flow measure, it is reasonable to expect it to respond to year to year changes, and Charts 16 and 17 indicate that this is normally the case, usually at statistically significant levels. Nevertheless, it is still striking how much countries vary. As Chart 17 indicates volatility of GDP movement is far more immediately translated into movement in per capita consumption in the US, UK and Australia than in Finland, Germany and Norway – indeed Norway is in the unique position that it seems able to nearly completely separate GDP movements from aggregate consumption changes.

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12 We stress the limited number of years of data (15) that are available.
13 A possible explanation is that oil price movements will affect Norwegian GDP, but because oil revenues are deposited in a sovereign wealth fund, consumption implications will be averaged over the price cycle.
The most cyclically sensitive component of the IEWB is the economic security Index, as Charts 18 and 19 illustrate\textsuperscript{14}. Unemployment is negatively related to economic security and GDP growth is positively related – no surprise there.

However, if one of the objectives of the welfare state is to improve citizens’ sense of economic security by decreasing their exposure to the volatility of GDP movements, then it is interesting that some countries do much better than others. When we estimate the equation

\textsuperscript{14} Since unemployment enters the calculation of the labour market security sub component of Economic Security, this is partly to be expected – but nothing in IEWB methodology would predict the variability across countries in $c_1$ and $c_2$ which we observe.
Δ Economic Security = k + c₂*(%Δ Output), our estimate of c₂ is statistically significant (at 95%) – but at very different levels – in almost all countries. France (0.006), Canada (0.005), Netherlands (0.005), Denmark (0.005), and Spain (0.004) are the countries where economic security fluctuates most with variations in GDP growth while economic security in Finland (0.002) and Norway (0.001) is much less correlated with GDP movements. One way of reading these results is to say that they indicate that these two nations do much better than others in insuring their citizens against the hazards of the business cycle, for any given size of business cycle shock.

5. Conclusion

The “Great Recession” of 2008 had very different impacts in different countries. Conventional indicators, like unemployment or GDP growth, show that in some countries (e.g. the US or Spain), it ushered in a prolonged and severe economic downturn, while in other nations (e.g. Australia or Germany) it produced a short negative blip in the data, with little apparent long term consequences.

This paper has tried to look at the Great Recession using the lens of the Index of Economic Well-Being and available data for the period 1995 to 2010 from 14 countries – Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. It has made three main points:

(1) Any aggregate index of well-being necessarily imposes some weighting of the components of well-being. This implies that calculations of trends in aggregate indices can be sensitive to the weighting of components, when trends in those components of well-being differ, as was the case across these 14 nations in the 2007-2010 period. In particular, since the 2007-2010 changes in economic security and equality were negative in most of the 14 countries studied while 2007-2010 trends in per capita consumption and aggregate wealth accumulation were more positive, weighting schemes that emphasize security and equality will tend to show more negative impacts of the Great Recession on aggregate well-being than weightings which emphasize aggregate consumption or wealth accumulation.

(2) Wealth stocks are accumulated over many years and the institutions that determine the distribution of income have great inertia within countries (particularly among that vast majority of the population who retain employment during normal year to year fluctuations in output or employment). Hence in normal times neither of these dimensions of economic well-being is very sensitive to year to year variations in output or employment within countries. By contrast, annual consumption flows and measures of economic security are much more sensitive. The caveat “in normal times” is necessary because non-marginal shocks and the multiplicative interaction between changes in the poverty rate and the average poverty gap can produce significant cyclical impacts on equality – as the example of Spain 2007-2010 illustrates.
(3) Countries differ a lot in the degree to which economic security and consumption flows vary with year to year fluctuations in output and employment. Some countries’ institutions are clearly much more effective than others in insulating economic security and average consumption from cyclical volatility, for any given size of shock.
Appendix A

Replacement of LIS Poverty and Income Distribution Estimates by Eurostat and National Estimates in the IEWB Database

The estimates of the Index of Economic Well-being (IEWB) used in this paper for 14 OECD countries (11 EU countries, Canada, the United States and Australia) for the 1995-2010 period are based on updated estimates for the IEWB for OECD countries for the 1980-2010 period recently prepared by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards. A major difference between these estimates and our earlier work is that the poverty and income distribution estimates used are no longer based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data but instead now use Eurostat estimates.

The LIS represented a major advance in the availability of consistent micro-data sets for the generation of comparable poverty and income distribution estimates across OECD countries. However, LIS datasets are only available for a small number of years and, for most countries, are not available beyond the mid-2000s. This means that time series data for LIS countries must often be interpolated between data years and the LIS cannot be used for analysis of the impact of the Great Recession.

Fortunately, Eurostat has calculated annual estimates up to 2010 in a consistent manner for its members six of the seven poverty and income distribution variables that the IEWB uses – specifically (using a 50% of median income concept of the poverty line) Eurostat publishes the poverty rate and gap for all persons, the poverty rate and gap for elderly persons, the poverty rate for single parent households. As well, Eurostat publishes estimates of the Gini coefficient of the inequality of money income. The only variable missing for our purposes is the poverty gap for single parent households. For this variable, values for years after the most recent LIS estimates are assumed equal to this value. These data represent a major advance in the availability of internationally comparable data for EU countries.

The three non-EU members of our dataset are Canada, the United States and Australia.

Statistics Canada publishes annual estimates for all six variables we need up to 2010 based on the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and these estimates have been included in the database.

No US statistical agency produces relative poverty estimates comparable to Eurostat estimates of “one half median income” poverty. However, the US Bureau of Census makes available the micro-data sets for the March supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), and poverty estimates can be generated from these data sets. The CSLS has used these micro datasets to generate poverty and income distribution estimates comparable to the Eurostat estimates for the 1995-2010 period. These estimates are used in the paper and are available on the CSLS website.
The Australia Bureau of Statistics also does not appear to produce relative poverty estimates consistent with Eurostat definitions. The CSLS is obtaining the micro-data set HILDA from the University of Melbourne to calculate comparable poverty and income distribution estimates for this paper. Unfortunately, the data has not yet been received so these estimates are not included in this paper. The estimates for Australia in the paper are based on the LIS, which only goes up to the mid-2000s. Estimates for recent years are assumed unchanged from the most recent LIS numbers. The final version of this paper will include estimates for Australia comparable with the Eurostat estimates.
References


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