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*Gas only? Sources of economic growth in major sectors of the Russian economy*

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Gas only? Sources of economic growth in major sectors of the Russian economy

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**Summary**

This paper is devoted to a supply-side perspective of economic growth of the Russian economy in 1995-2006. We develop a new detailed database of inputs, outputs and productivity measures at the level of 35 industries. With standard neoclassical approach to labor productivity disaggregation between industries and shift-share analysis we establish that most important sources of economic development of the Russian economy since 1999 are labor productivity in Market Services and labor reallocation, along with labor productivity growth of Exports. The results of this research support the idea that inputs-based *extensive* growth for decades before transition has been changed by *intensive* growth, which is boosted by Market Services.

Leading role of Market Services may be explained by multifactor productivity-based growth pattern of the Russian economy. This shift of the Russian economy from capital-concentrated manufacturing to services may be considered both as a consequence of overindustrialization in years of planned economy, and as a global trend of development, which is common for advanced economies. However, further research is needed to split labor productivity growth rates into capital intensity and multifactor productivity contributions directly (in progress now).

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This paper is based on a new Russia KLEMS database, which has been developing within the World KLEMS project ([http://www.worldklems.org](http://www.worldklems.org)).
Introduction

The U-shaped economic growth pattern of the Russian economy in transition is common for many former Socialist countries. The lowest point of real GDP is 60 per cent of the level of 1990, was passed in 1998, the year of a financial crisis. The post-crisis recovery accompanied by high growth rates of 6.7%. A supply-side analysis of growth could explain such performance, unveiling sources of growth. What we know about them at this stage is largely based upon empirical studies at the level of total economy or few highly aggregated sectors. In literature growth in Russia is mainly driven by multifactor productivity (MFP), as in other economies in transition.

Growth accounting at the level of industries, which has been developed in Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987); and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005), is more fruitful for this type of analysis. For example, productivity growth rates gap between US and EU has been explained in the paper of van Ark, O’Mahoney and Timmer (2008) by dissimilarities in performance of Market Services. For five European economies in transition Havlik, Leitner and Steher (2008) have found convergence of sectoral structure to Western European economies, which accompanied catching-up of productivity. The paper has pointed out to manufacturing as main engine of growth and productivity. However, far too little attention has been paid to sources of growth at the level of industries of the Russian economy.

In addition, no research has been found that surveyed an influence of capital of non-market quality, which had been put into operation before transition, within growth accounting framework. Campos and Coricelli (2002) pointed to this gap. After proper

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2 Average growth rates of official real GDP in 1999-2006.


estimation of capital services of existing capital stock of non-market quality, which had been accumulating for many decades of overinvestment before transition, role of productivity in economic growth of the Russian economy may be revised. However, it is assumed that such an exercise will offer solutions of multiple problems with historical statistics of the communist capital⁶.

Absence of supply-side analysis of economic growth at a detailed industrial level, and the problem of capital measurement place in question MFP as a major source of economic growth in the Russian economy. Consequently, there are two alternative stories of Russian economic development after transition, based on a neoclassical growth accounting framework. Real value added growth rates may be explained mainly by inputs growth or by productivity. This simple idea leads to extensive or intensive growth hypotheses, which would be used to explain growth pattern of the Russian economy.

Russian economic history for many decades before transition is a story of extensive growth. During last one and half centuries it was Manufacturing, which was considered as an engine of economic growth of the Russian economy. Russia’s drive to modernisation started in the mid 19th century. Through large scale investment by the state a process of industrialisation was started with the aim to catch-up with the more advanced countries in Europe. Economic growth was based on the exploitation of cheap labour and excessive investment directed by large state-led banks. This process intensified after the Revolution of 1917. High investment rates were forced by limiting consumption. In the 1950s and 60s, the apparent success of the Soviet economy became a subject for discussions in professional economic literature. In 1970, Russian GDP per capita had caught up considerably and stood at 40% of the US and 60% of Europe (Fig. 1).

⁶ Such statistics has been developing within Russia KLEMS project. Detailed historical data of capital of Manufacturing by types of assets in 1970-2004 has been published recently – see Voskoboynikov, Dryabina (2009). Data is available in the Internet: http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/lipier/dataeng.
However, by the end of the 1960s, the limitations of the planned economic system became increasingly visible. High prices on oil and gas after the Oil Price shock of mid-1970-s along with the system of transportation provided possibility for the government to direct additional resources to consumption and investments. This breathing space was exhausted by another sharp decline in oil prices in 1985. In 1991 the income gap with Europe had grown again to 55%.

Initially, prospects for growth in former socialist countries, including Russia, appeared to be bright. In contrast to many developing countries, they had already a sizeable and experienced industrial sector and a comparatively high level of educational attainment of the population. Introduction of a free market economy and privatisation of state enterprises were expected to unleash market forces improving efficiency and boosting innovation. By opening up to international trade and foreign investment (FDI) advanced technologies could be acquired. However, this expectation was not borne out (Blanchard 1997) and the decline in output was much more severe. In Russia, it took 14 years to reach the same income level as in 1991. By that time the gap with Europe has increased to 65%. In contrast, the transition of the Chinese economy away from a planning system in the 1980s was much more gradual and growth has been stable and high ever since (Fig. 1). In Russia, the crisis bottomed out in 1998. Unbalanced macroeconomic policy and a global financial crisis led to a default on foreign debt by the government. A sharp devaluation of the national currency along with an increase of oil prices launched a recovery period, with a decade of high and stable growth rates.

Extensive growth in modern Russia may be explained by competitive advantages of industries, benefited from low internal energy prices or effects of trade. Along with oil and gas-exporters, such industries have a substantial share of energy in costs. They produce metals, chemistry, and fertilizers. Another possible channel of extensive growth is a flow of investments from these energy-intensive industries to other sectors.

Intensive growth story is based on the idea that transition from plan to market is a process of gradual elimination of multiple price distortions, inherited from planned economy. In terms of Harbeger (1998), planned economy assumes high costs for its level
of price distortions. Plan-market transformation opens more possibilities for saving private costs and costs for the total economy in the same time. Intensive growth story assumes that industries with “Mushroom” growth patterns (Other Goods; Market Services) will dominate; the role of multifactor productivity will be substantial due to a proceeding process of elimination of multiple distortions.

Growth accounting literature provides evidence of this intensive growth story. Moreover, it offers an explanation of initial productivity decline with a collapse of institutions to support long productivity chains, known as disorganization (Blanchard, Kremer 1997). A concept of disorganization is used both for economies in transition and market economies to explain slowdown or a decline of productivity.

One of major consequences of a long period of planned economy in former socialist countries is a substantial sectoral structure distortion. It is explained by economic policy of command economy decades, which was focused on investments at the expense of consumption (Ofer 1987). Increase of productivity due to better labor reallocation is a part of the intensive growth story either. This dimension could be essential for transition economies due to a substantial shift of sectoral structure and accompanying reallocations. A shift from manufacturing to services started in first years of transition. Such a trend was common for all economies in transition, and may be considered as consequence of reallocation of resources on the basis of market incentive (Campos, Coricelli 2002). This labor reallocation could be a substantial source of labor productivity growth.

Structural changes observed in former Socialist economies in two decades of transition may reflect both a remove of distortions, and global trends of economic development (Campos, Coricelli 2002). A theoretical framework for such analysis is provided by the Chenery Hypothesis (Chenery 1960; CH) According to CH, sectoral structure of the economy depends on stage of development, its size, and endowment of

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7 See, for example, (De Broeck, Koen 2000)
8 About disorganization in economies in transition see, for example, Marin and Schnitzer (2005); in US and Japan – Kobayashi (2006; 2007).
natural resources. With CH it is possible to measure deviations of sectoral structure of a `distorted' planned economy from a `normal' economy. A comparison of an observed and a hypothetical CH sectoral structure of the former Soviet Union in 1988 is estimated by Döhrn and Heilemann (1996) (see Tab. 1). The table evidences that a structural change to services could be predicted.

This paper is devoted to a supply-side perspective of economic growth of the Russian economy in 1995-2006. We develop a new detailed database of inputs, outputs and productivity measures at the level of 35 industries. With standard neoclassical approach to labor productivity disaggregation between industries and shift-share analysis we establish that most important sources of economic development of the Russian economy since 1999 are labor productivity in Market Services and labor reallocation, along with labor productivity growth of Exports. The results of this research support the idea that inputs-based extensive growth for decades before transition has been changed by intensive growth, which is boosted by Market Services.

Leading role of Market Services may be explained by multifactor productivity-based growth pattern of the Russian economy. This shift of the Russian economy from capital-concentrated Manufacturing to Services may be considered both as a consequence of overindustrialization in years of planned economy, and as a global trend of development, which is common for developed economies. However, further research is needed to split labor productivity growth rates into capital intensity and multifactor productivity contributions directly (in progress now).

The paper has the following structure. An approach used and dataset description are given in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 is devoted to results and discussion. Section 5 has a general conclusion and directions of research of this project in progress. Detailed results of calculations, graphs and tables are presented in the Appendix.
Approach

Supply and Use tables (SUT) time series\(^9\) both in constant and current prices provides data of nominal gross output \(GO_j\), real gross output quantity index \(GO_j^{QI}\), nominal gross value added \(VA_j\), nominal intermediate inputs \(II_j\), and real intermediate inputs \(II_j^{QI}\), all indexed by time \(t\) (skipped if possible) and industry \(j\). Data on employment \(L_j\) (number of workers) is also given.

Quantity index of value added of a particular industry \(j\) \(VA_j^{QI}\) is defined as \((Productivity, \text{OECD Manual 2001})\)

\[
d \ln VA_j^{QI} = \frac{1}{s_{VA_{GO_j}}^{j}} \left( d \ln GO_j^{QI} - s_{II_{GO_j}}^{j} \cdot d \ln II_j^{QI} \right),
\]

where \(s_{VA_{GO_j}}^{j}\) and \(s_{II_{GO_j}}^{j}\) are shares of nominal value added and intermediate inputs in gross output for a corresponding industry\(^10\).

Labor productivity quantity index for an industry \(j\) is

\[
d \ln LP_j^{QI} \equiv d \ln VA_j^{QI} - d \ln L_j.
\]

Aggregated quantity indices of value added and labor are

\[
d \ln VA^{QI} = \sum_j s_{VA}^{j} \cdot d \ln VA_j^{QI},
\]

\[
d \ln L^{QI} = \sum_j s_{L}^{j} \cdot d \ln L_j.
\]

Aggregated labor productivity quantity index

\[
d \ln LP^{QI} \equiv d \ln VA^{QI} - d \ln L^{QI}
\]

\(^9\) See details about Russian SUT in the section “Data”

\(^{10}\) The following notation for shares is used: (i) \(s_{A}^{B} \equiv \frac{A}{B}\); (ii) \(s_{A}^{A} \equiv s_{A}^{j}\).
may be decomposed in the following way (Productivity, OECD Manual 2001; Nordhaus 2001; Stiroh 2002):

\[
(6) \quad d \ln LP^{Qj} = \sum_{j} s'_{VA} \cdot d \ln LP^{Qj} + \sum_{j} \left(s'_{VA} - s'_{L}ight) d \ln L_{j}.
\]

The first item of the right side of (6) accounts for labor productivity growth within an industry, caused by such internal sources of growth. The second item reflects an influence of interaction between changes of industry weights and labor input levels between industries. Reallocation “between” effect is positive in two cases. First, if a share of labor input in the industry is less than a share of labor compensation, and labor input growth is positive. In other words, if labor is scarce in the industry and labor inflow takes place. Second, if labor is excessive in the industry and labor input is decreased.

**Data**

Three variables of sectoral data are necessary to implement the labor productivity decomposition, which are real value added, nominal value added, and labor input.

Yearly years of transition are very difficult for statistical measurement of the Russian economy due to a transformation both in economics and statistics. Russian state statistics succeeded such features planned economy statistics as

- detailed elaboration of physical measures;
- exaggerated interest to Manufacturing and Agriculture;
- disdain of Services;
- inability to measure prices;
- a lack of experience in providing of households surveys;
- unique system of classifications, which is inconsistent with international standards;
- a system of material balances instead of SNA;
- non-transparency of methodologies and poor quality of official statistical publications.
A transition in statistics from late 1980-s to present is connected with a shift to international approaches, introduction of SNA-93 and price statistics in early 1990-s; a gradual substitution of old Soviet statistical classifications by international; implementation of conventional forms of statistical observation of labor market such as the Labor Force Survey, gradual improvement of statistical publications and the level of transparency. In particular, a change of the old industrial classification to a new one (NACE 1.0) took place in 2003-2004 years.

Official data of nominal value added in a new classification is available since 2002. Output time series used in this paper for the period 1995-2001 have been obtained with the official set of bridges.

Output

The algorithm of recalculating OKONKh historical time series into OKVED time series (1995-2001) is based on “OKONKh (All-Union Economic Sector Classification System)\(^\text{11}\) to OKVED (All-Russia Economic Activity Classification)\(^\text{12}\) bridge” published by the Center for Economic Classifications under the Ministry of Economic Development in 2002.

Calculations were performed on the basis of detailed output information under the Old classification and bridge-derived value difference matrices for the Old classification sectors and the New classification kinds of activities supplied by the Rosstat, the lines of each matrix reflecting activities in compliance with as much detailed OKONKh list as possible. The bottom lines were equal to the indicator values for the listed activities while the footing was equal the indicator values for the listed sectors. Moreover, two situations were possible:

a) a specific OKONKh sector associated with one or sole activity under OKVED;
b) a specific OKONKh sector distributed between several activities under OKVED.

\(^{11}\) In the following text it is mentioned as “the Old Classification”.

\(^{12}\) In the following text it is mentioned as “the New Classification”. The New classification is an adapted version of NACE 1.0. To the level of four digits it is similar to NACE 1.0.
Where a specific OKONKh sector was distributed between several activities under OKVED, the breakdown was equal, i.e., in halves, in three equal parts etc.

The results of recalculation of indicators derived from the said matrices were then compared to empirical output data across OKVED for 2002\(^{13}\) which were assumed as reference. Where the calculated results varied considerably from reference values, the calculated results were adjusted. Adjustment was performed by changing the distribution ratios of OKONKh sectors between several OKVED activities. In some cases, additional judgment-based adjustment was performed upon agreement of the staff of the relevant Rosstat divisions.

The 2002-2005 time series were produced on the basis of the published SNA output data for OKVED activities for these years. Class C “MINING AND QUARRYING” and D “TOTAL MANUFACTURING” data were additionally disaggregated on the basis of more detailed primary information.

For all calculation periods, consistency between the total value of calculated indicators and the officially published output bottom line for the economy as a whole (the OKONKh list before 2002) was observed.

The database of the paper is based on 35-industries of NACE 1.0 (Tab. 5). Sectoral aggregation of Market and Non-market services is obvious. A split between industries of Exported Goods and Other Goods sectors is based on relative comparative advantages (RCA) indices. RCA indices have been calculated using the International Trade in Goods database\(^{14}\). If major products of an industry have comparative advantages, the industry was put into Exported Goods sector.

**Double Deflation**

Value-added based labor productivity measure is sensitive to a double deflation procedure. A redistribution of labor productivity between industries could be sensitive

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\(^{13}\) Rosstat collected the 2002 primary data simultaneously for two classifications – OKONKh and OKVED – to facilitate transition from one system to another.

\(^{14}\) [http://www.intracen.org/tradstat/sitc3-3d/indexre.htm](http://www.intracen.org/tradstat/sitc3-3d/indexre.htm)
to changes of relative prices of output and intermediate inputs. It has been shown for retail trade sector (Timmer, Inklaar, and van Ark 2005), semiconductors and computers industry (Triplett 1996). Comparisons of productivity levels between industries are not robust to double deflation either, as it has been shown for pre-war UK-Germany comparisons (Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007).

All these issues could be not essential if double deflation is used by Russian official statistics. However, it is not clear if double deflation is implemented or not, and for what years\textsuperscript{15}. Another reason why we refrain from official real value added data is the fact, that a definition of this measure used by Rosstat is not available, so it is impossible to control inconsistency bias at the level of industries.

Our imputations of value added are based on the definition (1) and imputed data of SUT time series in constant prices. The only detailed benchmark SUT for the Russian economy was compiled as of 1995 for 120 industries in the Old classification. Less detailed SUT’s have been published in 1996-2003 in the Old classification, and in 2004-2006 in the New classification in current prices only. All SUT’s are consistent with SNA of corresponding years.

We have imputed SUT’s for the period in questions in three steps. First, we calculated SUT’s of 1995-2003 in the new classification, using official bridges. Second, we obtained implicit deflators of gross output as a ratio of official nominal gross output values and the physical volume indices. If necessary, nominal values were disaggregated with more detailed data of gross output or goods and services dispatched. Finally, we implemented the imputation methodology of Temurshoev, Timmer (2010).

Results of a sensitivity analysis of labor productivity growth rates are presented in the table 3. Gross-output based measures of labor productivity could be considered as “value-added based” labor productivity indices with the assumption, that 

\[ d \ln GO^{0i} = d \ln VA^{0i} \]

and used as a proxy of official indices for the whole period. Such

\textsuperscript{15} It is mentioned by Rosstat officials that double deflation procedure is used in official data (Masakova 2006), but no details are given.
a comparison is useful to control robustness of our results if we use methodology, which is close to official.

According to the table 3, major conclusions remain the same for both approaches. Double deflation leads to lower values of labor productivity growth rates in most industries in 1995-1998, and higher rates in 1999-2006, which could be explained by a substantial change of relative prices on inputs and outputs after the appreciation of ruble in the crisis of 1998.

Labor

The dataset covers a number of workers for the period of 1995-2006 in 35 industries of the New classification. It is based on the Labor Force Survey data.

The Russian industrial classification has been changed in 2003-2004. The last version of the old classification was adapted in 1976, and had been used by the Russian statistical office (Rosstat) till 2004. The new classification is a Russian version of NACE 1.0 (OKVED). The new classification has been adopted in 2002, and has been using since 2003. In 2003-2004 Rosstat collected data in both classifications (Masakova 2006).

There is no official SNA-consistent employment data, which would be published by Rossat. Major sources of employment data at macro level are the Labor Related Establishments Survey (LRES) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS)\textsuperscript{16}.

LRES is based on official reports of firms. It covers employee of large, medium and small firms, and government organizations. Data is available for all years in question. Rosstat has been publishing data on employee at the level of one digit in the New classification since 1995. Data on education, age and gender is limited and not published. A more detailed data of three-four digits of the New classification is available since 2002.

An object of observation of the Labor Force Survey is a household. LFS covers all kinds of labor force, including self-employed and partially employed, formal and informal activities. Methodology of LFS is based on recommendations of International

\textsuperscript{16} We use the International Labor Organization terminology, naming Russian statistical surveys
Labor Organization. The first round of LFS in Russia took place in November 1992. From 1999 it takes place on a quarterly basis. Data on a number of workers is available at the level of one digit of OKVED from 1997. In addition, a more detailed data of Russian LFS is published by sub industries of Manufacturing (D in NACE 1.0). Since the survey has been initially based on the ILO methodology, data was collecting with NACE 1.0-consistent industrial classification even in years 1997-2001, in other words, before the New classification had been adopted. The Survey provides a set of determinants of labor force quality such as education, age, and gender. However, a weak point of LFS is a poor quality of industrial allocation of labor. This disadvantage is common for household surveys in other countries. It is explained by mistakes of respondents, when they answer the question about a sector in which they have a job.

LFS and LRES datasets on a number of employees are not consistent (see Fig. 2, 3). Such analysis has been provided for a period in 1998-2008. The difference between levels of the two measures is about 7 millions in 1998, and increases afterwards. By 2008 it is about 18 millions, of which about 3.5 millions fall at Wholesale and retail trade, by 2 millions falls at Manufacturing, Transport and Communications, and 1.5 millions on Agriculture (Fig. 2 and 3). The discrepancy is explained by self-employed, secondary employment, and an increase of employee, who have jobs in firms not covered by LRES (Vishnevskai et al. 2000).

The dataset of employment is based on the LFS data of a number of workers at the level of one digit of the New classification. The LRES dataset is used for a decomposition of spectral data to the level of detalization of the New sectoral classification, and for imputations of employment growth rates in 1995-1997, not covered by LFS. Taking into account data availability, such an approach seems preferable for four reasons. First, the LFS dataset is the only, which is representative for the whole population of Russia. In contrast to LRES, it covers informal activities, secondary jobs, self-employment, and mobilized personnel in different government organizations. From this point of view, LFS corresponds to Russian SNA and SUT’s, in which adjustments for different forms of shadow economy and informal activities are
implemented by Rosstat. Second, LFS provides sufficient information about such labor quality indicators as gender, education and age. Third, LFS is the only source of real hours worked, including secondary and shadow activities, and self-employment. Forth, LFS is based on methodology and recommendations of International Labor Organization, which provides better consistency with the LFS-based data for other countries.

In comparison with LRES, there are two key disadvantages of LFS, which are low accuracy of industrial detalization and inconsistency with such measures of firm-based statistics as output and investments (capital stock).

The dataset has been obtained by the following way. LFS data was decomposed by the New classification industries (Table 5) with a more detailed LRES data for the benchmark year 2002. Data before this year has been imputed with the assumption of the same growth rates in an industry, for which LFS data is available, and sub industries to be imputed. Data after this year has been decomposed with detailed LRES data. Year 2002 as the benchmark year has been chosen, because it is the first year for which detailed sectoral data in OKVED are based on direct observations, and because of a relatively low level of the discrepancy of a number of employees between LRES and LFS in comparison with the following years (see Fig. 2, 3).

**Results and discussion**

Labor productivity growth is major source of economic development of the Russian economy in 1995-2006, as can be seen from the table 2. What is the sectoral structure of labor productivity growth? Table 4 presents results of labor productivity decomposition by sectors and industries. It indicates that engines of growth are Market Services and Exported Goods. A direct contribution of value added productivity growth of Market Services (“Within” column) dominates for two reasons. First, labor productivity of the sector is above average. Second, as shown in Fig. 4a, its share is almost half of total value added, and the largest in the economy. Labor productivity
level of Exported goods could be higher as more capital intensive sector, but its value added share is 20 percent points less.

Growth pattern had changed after the crisis of 1998. Before the crisis Russian ruble had been highly appreciated. Devaluation of ruble due to the crisis promoted production of import substituted goods, and an increase of export. Before the crisis, output fall could be explained by labor decline and zero productivity growth (Tab. 2). If we now turn to the post-crisis period, outstanding output growth of 7.4 per cent had been achieved with 6.2 per cent growth of labor productivity along with a moderate increase of labor.

Comparing results for the periods before and after the crisis (Table 4), it can be seen that only two industries provide a substantial impact to labor productivity growth rates in both of them, which are export-oriented Mining and Wholesale Trade. A possible explanation for this might be that Mining had strong demand from the world market and an access to investments even in the recession before 1998. A strong position of Wholesale Trade could be interpreted as following. A substantial share of wholesale trade services is intended to support Mining export.

One unanticipated finding is a sharp increase of labor productivity growth rates impact of Agriculture after the crisis (from -0.25 to 0.74). It could be a consequence of increased demand due to changes of terms of trade, and import substitution effects, accompanied by labor outflow. However, these results must be interpreted with caution because quality of rural employment data is worse than of other industries. A shift to better measures of labor inputs, based on such quality indicators as gender, male and education could cut this effect down.

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18 In contrast to earlier findings in the literature, no labor productivity decline has been found before 1998.

19 Yearly averaged growth rates of real value added in 7.4 per cent are higher than the official value of 6.7 per cent of the same period 1999-2006. This difference is explained by double deflation of real value added reported in Tables 2 and 4 (see “Data” section).

20 Apart from Non-market services.
A domination of Market Services in labor productivity growth rates is not common both for developed economies and for economies in transition. The results of van Ark, O’Machony and Timmer (2008) indicate that an impact of Market Services in labor productivity growth rates prevails over other sectors in US, and in two of 10 Old members of EU, which are United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Only Czech Republic is similar to Russia among five other East European economies considered by Havlik, Leitner and Stehrer (2008).

In long run perspective, services-driven growth is unprecedented for the Russian economy. For many decades before transition capital intensity in a sector of production of goods had been a major engine of growth (De Broek, Koen 2000), keeping sector of Services underdeveloped. By 1988 a share of Market and State Services of the economy of the Soviet Union (Döhrn and Heilemann 1996; data is presented in Tab. 1) was 27.8 per cent of Net Material Product instead of 52 per cent hypothetical for the economy of the same level of development. In other words, a transformation between the two types of development has taken place in first years of transition.

Such shift has been accompanied by substantial structural changes and reallocations of inputs, which affects economic performance as well. As shown in Figure 4, sectoral structure of labor shares is inconsistent with shares of value added²¹. In accordance with (6), reallocation of labor from Non-Market Services to Market Services and Exported Goods boosts aggregated labor productivity growth. Such redistribution happened in 1995-2006, providing extra 0.6 per cent of growth rates of total 4 (Table 4). However, Figure 4 shows that there is much more room for growth due to labor reallocation. Such labor reallocations are substantial in Hungary and Poland (0.4 and 0.7 per cent from total 3.6 and 4.3 of annual labor productivity growth consequently in 1995-2004)²². Labor reallocation influence is much smaller in developed economies (see van Ark et al, 2008).

²¹ Lazarev and Gregory (2007) have pointed out to this inconsistency of labor allocation.

²² Havlik et al 2008
It seems interesting to compare Russian pattern of structural change with the new evidence in advanced economies, provided by Jorgenson and Timmer (2009), considering it as a superposition of features of transitional and advanced economies. The results of this study show that services sector has dominated in the economies of EU, Japan and the U.S., but heterogeneous. Namely, (i) finance and business services demonstrate low labor productivity growth and extended employment and value added shares. Extension of this sector in Russia is low, and labor productivity growth is moderate in comparison with Wholesale trade. (ii) Distribution services in advanced economies have constant value added and labor shares, but demonstrate high labor productivity growth. Russian Wholesale and Retail industries have also demonstrated high labor productivity growth rates, but corresponding labor shares are definitely not constant.

Finally, we summarize evidences for intensive and extensive explanations of the Russian economy performance. A leading role of not capital-consentrated Market Services\(^{23}\) in labor productivity growth and substantial influence of labor reallocation does provide evidence for MFP-driven growth. On the other hand, for decisive answer it is necessary to take into account capital services within the complete growth accounting framework. This part of the project is in progress now.

Further research is needed to clarify also the following questions. Is this outstanding performance of the leaders of Market Service sector (Wholesale trade and Inland transport) connected with vertical integration of such large Mining-based monopolies as Gazprom or Rosneft?\(^{24}\) Why labor reallocation in many industries in 1995-1998 was negative? For example, the most productive sector (Market Services) demonstrated the highest internal (within) labor productivity growth rates in years

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\(^{23}\) In comparison with Manufacturing and Mining

\(^{24}\) According to official declaration, major activity of Gazprom is Wholesale trade. Major pipelines are included into Inland transport.
before the crisis\textsuperscript{25}. How outstanding labor productivity growth in Agriculture in 1999-2006 may be explained?

\textit{Conclusion}

The paper develops a new detailed dataset of productivity measures for the Russian economy in transition. It provides evidence that labor productivity growth in market services forms a labor productivity pattern in the Russian economy in transition. This specific role of market services may be explained by to complementing trends. First, it is a catch-up of underdeveloped Market Services sector; second is a global increase of labor productivity in Distribution services. Two other substantial sources of labor productivity growth are sector of Export Goods and labor reallocation.

Returning to the two alternative growth stories posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to add more in favor of intensive one. Economic growth in Russia is boosted by market services, which are \textit{less capital intensive}, than manufacturing or mining. Another important factor of growth, labor reallocation, is a part of the intensive story as well.

Results open a possibility for two generalizations. First, the role of Mining is unexpectedly modest in labor productivity economic growth. Second, a major source of labor productivity growth is a catch-up in services, which is observed in many East-European former Socialist countries.

This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. A growth accounting exercise is necessary to clarify a role of capital intensity in growth. This part of the project is in progress now. We need more accurate measures of labor input, based on hours worked by different groups of labor force. Finally, further disaggregation of Market Services is necessary to identify sources of growth better.

\textsuperscript{25} Negative “between” effect of Market Services in 1995-1998 is explained by a decrease of a number of workers and positive difference of value-added and labor shares in (6). Such a counterintuitive outflow of labor could be connected with poor quality of labor decomposition between industries in 1995-1997.
References


**Appendix. Tables and Graphs**


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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Energy, Mining and Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Market-oriented services and State sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Tab. 2. Real value added growth rates decomposition in 1995-2006 (in percentage points)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real Value Added</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-2.33</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Productivity</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Numbers may not add up due to rounding.*
### Tab. 3.
Labor productivity growth rates and double deflation by sectors (bold) and major industries
(in percentage points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors and major industries</th>
<th>Labor productivity growth rates based on Gross Output</th>
<th>Double Deflated Value Added</th>
<th>Gross Output</th>
<th>Double Deflated Value Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland transport</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial intermediation</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exported goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Metals</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarring</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, nec</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical and Optical Equipm.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, Beverage and Tobacco</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-market services</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Own calculations, based on the Russia KLEMS database

*Notes:* Numbers may not add up due to rounding
Tab. 4. Labor productivity growth by sectors (bold) and key industries (in percentage points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Within</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Within</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL ECONOMY</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Services</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland transport</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exported goods</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>2.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic metals</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quar.</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-exp. Goods</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-M. services</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations, based on the Russia KLEMS database.  
Notes: Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name of industry</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AtB</td>
<td>Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15t16</td>
<td>Food, Beverages and Tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17t18</td>
<td>Textiles and Textile Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Leather, Leather and Footwear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Wood and Products of Wood and Cork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>21t22</td>
<td>Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chemicals and Chemical Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rubber and Plastics</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Other Non-Metallic Mineral</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>27t28</td>
<td>Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Machinery, Nec</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>30t33</td>
<td>Electrical and Optical Equipment</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>34t35</td>
<td>Transport Equipment</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>36t37</td>
<td>Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Electricity, Gas and Water Supply</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles</td>
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<td>Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods</td>
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<td>Hotels and Restaurants</td>
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<td>Post and Telecommunications</td>
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<td>Financial Intermediation</td>
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<td>Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>O</td>
<td>Other Community, Social and Personal Services</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Private Households with Employed Persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig 1. GDP per capita (in constant 1990 US$, PPP converted)

Fig. 2. Total number of employee in the Russian economy from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) and from Labor-Related Establishement Survey (LRES) in 1995-2006.

Source: Rosstat.

Fig. 3. Difference between a number of employee from Labor Force Survey and the Labor-Related Establishement Survey in 2008.

Source: Rosstat.
Fig. 4. Sectoral shares of value added (a) and labor (b) in 1995 and 2005 (percentage points).

Source: Rosstat.